### AT: Techno Optimism 2AC

#### Our framework is that the alternative should be judged on the efficacy of its response to existing institutional practices

#### This means that the neg should have to answer the following questions – what is the alternative institution/social order that should be put into place? Is that feasible? What would have to be done to create that change and what would be the consequences of those actions?

#### Absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### **Global starvation DA – failure to utilize nature means no one can eat**

#### **Even if they win discourse first, you should evaluate impacts within the framework of neoliberal knowledge production – market relations are *stable* social constructions that people *assume to be true* – only using them as a starting point is politically productive**

Jones & Spicer ‘9

(Campbell, Senior Lecturer in the School of Management at U of Leicester, Andre, Associate Professor in the Dept of Industrial Relations @ Warwick Business School U of Warwick, Unmasking the Entrepreneur, pgs. 22-23)

The third strand in our proposed critical theory of entrepreneurship involves questions of the 'extra-discursive' factors that structure the context in which these discourses appear. The result of privileging language often results in losing sight of political and economic relations, and for this reason, a turn to language and a concomitant disavowal of things extra-discursive have been roundly criticised (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Armstrong, 2001; Reed, 1998,2000,2009). An analysis of discourse cannot alone account for the enduring social structures such as the state or capitalism. Mike Reed has argued that a discursive approach to power relations effectively blinds critical theorists to issues of social structures: Foucauldian discourse analysis is largely restricted to a tactical and localised view of power, as constituted and expressed through situational-specific 'negotiated orders', which seriously underestimates the structural reality of more permanent and hierarchal power relations. It finds it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with institutionalised stabilities and continuities in power relations because it cannot get at the higher levels of social organisation in which micro-level processes and practices are embedded. (Reed, 2000: 526-7) These institutional stabilities may include market relations, the power of the state, relations like colonialism, kinship and patriarchy. These are the 'generative properties' that Reed (1998: 210) understands as 'mak(ing) social practices and forms - such as discursive formations - what they are and equip(ing) them with what they do'. Equally Thompson and Ackroyd also argue that in discourse analysis 'workers are not disciplined by the market, or sanctions actually or potentially invoked by capital, but their own subjectivities' (1995: 627). The inability to examine structures such as capitalism means that some basic forms of power are thus uninvestigated. Focusing solely on entrepreneurship discourse within organisations and the workplace would lead to a situation where pertinent relations that do not enter into discourse are taken to not exist. Such oversights in discursive analyses are that often structural relations such as class and the state have become so reified in social and mental worlds that they disappear. An ironic outcome indeed. Even when this structural context is considered, it is often examined in broad, oversimplified, and underspecified manners. This attention to social structure can be an important part of developing a critical theory of entrepreneurship, as we remember that the existing structural arrangements at any point are not inevitable, but can be subjected to criticism and change. In order to deal with these problems, we need to revive the concept of social structure. Thus we are arguing that 'there exist in the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.) objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations' (Bourdieu, 1990: 122). Objective still means socially constructed, but social constructions that have become solidified as structures external to individual subjects. Examples of these structures may include basic 'organising principals' which are relatively stable and spatially and historically situated such as capitalism, kinship, patriarchy and the state. Some entrepreneurship researchers, particularly those drawing on sociology and political science, have shown the importance of social structure for understanding entrepreneurship (see for example Swedberg, 2000).

#### We solve better – current big nuclear tech is unsafe, the plan is key to shift to small reactors that reduce potential for extinction level accidents and provide energy to developing countries – don’t let them get away with saying the alt does anything, no way to resolve big oil in the US

#### Debating the aff is key to solve it – imaginative familiarity with nuclear power creates trust and overcomes public misunderstanding – creates tipping point for new facilities

Butler, Parkhill, & Pidgeon 11

(Catherine, Research Fellow at Cardiff University, Karen, Research Fellow at Cardiff University, Nicholas, Professor of Environmental Psychology at Cardiff University, “Nuclear Power After Japan: The Social Dimensions”, November-December 2011, http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2011/November-December%202011/Nuclear-full.html)

Nuclear power has, beyond its beginnings where “glamorous reactors” were anticipated with “a great sense of excitement,” had a tumultuous relationship with the public.18 It has been characterized as a “uniquely dreaded” technology due to its long-standing association with atomic weaponry, invisible and long-lasting effects of radiation, and concerns about waste disposal.19 In the 1980s after the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island (1979) and the disaster at Chernobyl (1986), public opposition to nuclear power was at an all-time high in many countries. Indeed, data from the United States even before Chernobyl suggested that public opposition to nuclear new build rose from around 20% in the 1970s to more than 60% in the early 1980s.20 Other research has identified public distrust of regulators, government, and the nuclear industry to manage risks responsibly and provide truthful information to the public as a key reason for erosion of support.21¶ Over the past 10 years opinion polling has indicated a reduction in opposition. For example, a global poll by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Nuclear Energy Agency showed in 2010 that support for nuclear energy had increased in countries such as the United States, Japan, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom.22 Looking specifically at the United Kingdom, polling of the British public conducted in early 2010 found a very balanced picture, with 46% of those questioned favoring replacement or expansion of the existing nuclear capacity in Britain as compared to 47% who wanted it closed or phased out at the end of the existing program.23 However, a closer look at the national polling data shows a more complex picture, with a large proportion of recent national support remaining fragile—a conditional or “reluctant acceptance” at best.24¶ From such research we can posit that during the short to medium term following Fukushima, many “reluctant acceptors” may withdraw their support for nuclear power and in particular for nuclear new build. Thus opposition during this time would correspondingly increase. Early polling research suggests this is exactly the case, with many countries seeing a rise in opposition that outweighs support even by the thinnest margins; the United States is a notable exception where support for nuclear power is marginally higher than opposition (see Figure 1).25 In the case of Japan, more than half of those who indicated they now oppose nuclear energy to produce electricity do so due to the events in Japan; significant proportions of the public in other countries also state this is the case (see Figure 1). On the basis of such findings, we might expect that those communities who are proposed as hosts for a new reactor may now oppose such developments.¶ For communities with no experience with a nuclear facility, it is likely that within the short to medium term, potential public contestation surrounding nuclear power may indeed prove to be a stumbling block.26 However, this is not necessarily true of all proposed reactor sites. For example, in the United Kingdom proposed sites are either on or adjacent to an existing nuclear power station. Previous research tells us that the response of people in such communities does not always mirror that obtained from national samples. While reluctant acceptance may be a feature of discourse in such communities and Fukushima may prompt the “extraordinariness” of living close to a nuclear facility to cause momentary reframings of nuclear power as a risk and threat issue, there are some important qualitative nuances to public perceptions that may lead to differing medium- to long-trends following Fukushima.27 Examples include the importance of social familiarity, which through social networks connected to the power station (i.e., either being or knowing a power station worker) or through imaginary positioning (being able to imagine how workers think, feel, and follow working practices) demystifies the power station as a distant institutional organization.28 As such, trust in power station workers is engendered. Although hidden anxieties may come to the surface in light of Fukushima, these could also be moderated by the distancing of the events as irrelevant to localized contexts and working practices, serving to reify the perceived safety of local plants (and trust in plant operators) rather than undermining it.29

#### Turn – the alt causes coal fill-in – that’s 100x worse for the environment – critiques of nuke production are idealistic and treat the energy in a vacuum, not in context

Monbiot ‘11

(George, columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), March 21, 2011, “Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/pro-nuclear-japan-fukushima)

But the energy source to which most economies will revert if they shut down their nuclear plants is not wood, water, wind or sun, but fossil fuel. On every measure (climate change, mining impact, local pollution, industrial injury and death, even radioactive discharges) coal is 100 times worse than nuclear power. Thanks to the expansion of shale gas production, the impacts of natural gas are catching up fast. Yes, I still loathe the liars who run the nuclear industry. Yes, I would prefer to see the entire sector shut down, if there were harmless alternatives. But there are no ideal solutions. Every energy technology carries a cost; so does the absence of energy technologies. Atomic energy has just been subjected to one of the harshest of possible tests, and the impact on people and the planet has been small. The crisis at Fukushima has converted me to the cause of nuclear power.

#### Perm – do both – doing the aff while considering structural violence allows us to check back against unjust effects of the plan – there’s only a link of omission

#### Frame the alternative within consequentialism – our framing is most ethical because all *practical* alternatives are worse and cause violecne

-coming up with an alternative economic system *matters*

-don’t take a leap of faith

-any alternative is utopian and unachievable

-capitalism can be reformed

Richards 9 – PhD in Philosophy @ Princeton

Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, “Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem,” pg. 31-32

Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with **an unrealizable ideal** rather than with its **live alternatives**) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that **we can never realize**. When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just **compared with what?** It doesn’t do anyone any good to tear down a society that is “unjust” compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. That’s one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it **blinds us to** the **important differences** among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldn’t surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But that’s bad moral reasoning. The question isn’t whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The **question is whether there’s a better alternative** in this life. “Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has **never existed**—and **never will**.” —Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If we’re going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extreme—like communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the **terrible cost** of trying to create a society in which ev- eryone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesn’t mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on **reality rather than romantic ideals**. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: can’t we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the **worst way to do that** is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.

#### Alt fails – absent the plan there’s a massive increase in structural violence as states rush to develop nuclear weapons

#### Economic rationality is ethical and solves war – self-interest motivates individuals to sacrifice some autonomy to produce security and protect the rights of others

Aasland ‘9

(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66)

Business ethics, in the sense of ethics *for* business, illustrates this: its perspective is that of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ where the constraints that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the unfortunate consequences for oneself, postpone the ‘war’, in a direct or metaphoric sense of the word (*ibid.*: 70-71). This enlightened self-interest forms the base not only of the market economy, but also of a social organization and manifestation of human rights, and even of some ethical theories. It is a calculated and voluntary renunciation of one’s own freedom in order to obtain in return security and other common goals (*ibid.*: 72). The fact that economic, political and legal theories appeal to enlightened self-interest does not imply, however, that we should discard them. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. It is rather the opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because the primary quality of the enlightened self-interest is that it restricts egocentricity. Our *practical reason* (which was Kant’s words for the reason that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions on individual freedom. In this way practical reason may postpone (for an indefinite time) violence and murder among people. This has primarily been the raison-d’être of politics and the state, but it is today taken over more and more by corporate organizations, as expressed in the new term for business ethics, as *corporate social responsibility* and *corporate citizenship* (see chapter 2). Thanks to this ‘postponement of violence’ provided by politics and economic rationality, people may unfold their freedom within the laws and regulations set up by society (Burggraeve, 2003: 77).

#### Deterrence is an impact turn – China will try to take over when we relax deterrence

#### Even if security and risk calculation are flawed, engaging in them creates discourse of social welfare and promotes a democratic civic culture that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life

Loader – Criminology Prof at Oxford – 7

(Civilizing Security, Pg. 5)

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.

#### Alt leads to paralysis – constant rejection fails

#### Management is inevitable- it’s only a question of what kind of intervention is used. Past interventions will result in extinction unless actively reversed

Levy 99- PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash

Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

### AT: Complexity K 2AC

#### Predictions can be qualitative – you can make predictions based on different probabilities

#### **Applying complexity theory leads to policy paralysis and numerous other failures**

HENDRICK ‘9 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, <http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf>)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision.

In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

#### Defer to best evidence to resolve impacts – only way to avoid dogmatism and create effective policy analysis

Sil ‘2k

Rudra Sil, assistance professor of Political Science @ the University of Pennsylvania. “Beyond boundaries?: disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in International Studies. 2001. P. 161.

In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it "data" or "narrative"—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and inter-pretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically consistent" hypotheses "supported by data" and the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate, and refine general inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

#### Their epistemology K is flawed – social constructions are knowable – they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in predictable ways – prefer the specificity of the aff to broad philosophical indictments

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### **That’s most ethical – failure of preventative action and predictions drives structural violence and inequality, only actions that act to preserve future generations can resolve power relations**

Kurasawa‘4,

(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, Constellations Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In the previous section, I described how the capacity to produce, disseminate, and receive warning signals regarding disasters on the world stage has developed in global civil society. Yet the fact remains that audiences may let a recklessness or insouciance toward the future prevail, instead of listening to and acting upon such warnings. There is no doubt that the short-sightedness and presentism are strong dynamics in contemporary society, which is enveloped by a “temporal myopia” that encourages most individuals to live in a state of chronological self-referentiality whereby they screen out anything that is not of the moment.22 The commercial media, advertising, and entertainment industries are major contributors to this “tyranny of real time”23 that feeds a societal addiction to the ‘live’ and the immediate while eroding the principle of farsightedness. The infamous quip attributed to Madame de Pompadour, ‘après nous, le déluge,’ perfectly captures a sense of utter callousness about the future that represents one of presentism’s most acute manifestations. Two closely related notions underlie it: the belief that we should only concern ourselves with whether our actions, or lack thereof, have deleterious consequences visible to us in the short-to medium-term (temporally limited responsibility); and sheer indifference toward the plight of those who will come after us (generational self-centeredness). Substantively, the two are not much different because they shift the costs and risks of present-day decisions onto our descendants. “The crisis of the future is a measure of the deficiency of our societies, incapable as they are of assessing what is involved in relationships with others,” Bindé writes. “This temporal myopia brings into play the same processes of denial of others as social shortsightedness. The absence of solidarity in time between generations merely reproduces selfishness in space within the same generation.”24 Thus, to the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-back-yard’) politics of the last few decades can be added the ‘not-in-my-lifetime’ or ‘not-to-my-children’ lines of reasoning. For members of dominant groups in the North Atlantic region, disasters are something for others to worry about – that is, those who are socio-economically marginal, or geographically and temporally distant. The variations on these themes are numerous. One is the oft-stated belief that prevention is a luxury that we can scarcely afford, or even an unwarranted conceit. Accordingly, by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate. Why squander time, energy, and resources to anticipate and thwart what are, after all, only hypothetical dangers? Why act today when, in any case, others will do so in the future? Why not limit ourselves to reacting to cataclysms if and when they occur? A ‘bad faith’ version of this argument goes even further by seeking to discredit, reject, or deny evidence pointing to upcoming catastrophes. Here, we enter into the domain of deliberate negligence and “culpable ignorance,”25 as manifest in the apathy of US Republican administrations toward climate change or the Clinton White House’s disengenuous and belated responses to the genocides in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being. What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense ¶ of “intergenerational solidarity” toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today.26 But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the non-descript ‘don’t forget later generations’ ilk). Hans Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.27 Fully appreciating Jonas’s position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori “principle of the will” or “volition” of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.28 Ex post facto evaluation of an act’s outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber’s discussion of the “ethic of absolute ends,” the “passionate devotion to a cause” elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.29 By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

#### Ethic of farsightedness key to solve all global threats – even if our specific predictions are bad, future-oriented projections are a good method and a DA to the alt

Kurasawa 4

(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, *Constellations* Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring.

#### **Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative – Scenario Planning is consistent with complexity theory**

KAVALSKI ‘7 (Emilian; University of Alberta, “The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of international life,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, v. 20 n. 3, September)

In a further examination of the cognitive perspective, some proponents of CIR theory have suggested ‘scenarios’ as tools for the modelling of complexity (Feder 2002; Harcourt and Muliro 2004). Scenarios are defined as ‘imaginative stories of the future that describe alternative ways the present might evolve over a given period of time’ (Heinzen 2004, 4). They focus on subjective interpretations and perceptions. Understanding complexity, therefore, would depend on the relationship between the ‘cognitive schema’ (that is, available knowledge) and the ‘associative network’ (that is, the activation of the links between different concepts) of the observer (Bradfield 2004, 40). The suggestion is that in some sense ‘we create our own consciousness of complexity by seeking it out’ (LaPorte 1975, 329). In this respect, some proponents of CIR theory have asserted the analysis of discourses as an important distinction between human and nonhuman complex systems (Geyer 2003b, 26).14

The intellectual considerations of these epistemological frameworks suggest the challenging conceptual and methodological problems facing CIR theory. On a metatheoretical level, the problem stems from the realization that students of the complexity of international life can never be fully cognizant of the underlying truths, principles and processes that ‘govern reality’ because this would (i) involve (a degree of) simplification of complex phenomena (LaPorte 1975, 50), as well as (ii) imply ‘knowing the not knowable’ (Cioffi-Revilla 1998, 11). As suggested, analytically, the conscious consideration of complexity is hindered by the inherent difficulty of formalizing uncertainty and contingency (Whitman 2005, 105). Some commentators, therefore, have rejected the possibility of constructing comprehensive models for the study of complexity altogether in an attempt to overcome the trap of having to justify their methodologies in ways that are understandable to conventional IR. Therefore, a number of CIR proponents rely on ‘sensemaking’ (Browaeys and Baets 2003, 337; Coghill 2004, 53), ‘whatiffing’ (Beaumont 1994, 171) and other forms of ‘speculative thinking’ (Feder 2002, 114) for their interpretations of the complexity of international life. The claim is that the acceptance of endogeneity as a ‘fact’ of international life provides more insightful modes of analysis than the linear-regression-type approach of traditional IR (Johnston 2005 1040). Without ignoring some controversial aspects of incorporating ontological and epistemological reflection into methodological choices, the claim here is that CIR theory suggests intriguing heuristic devices that both challenge conventional wisdom and provoke analytical imaginations.

Complex international relations theory, therefore, proffers analytical tools both for explaining and understanding discontinuities. It is claimed that its approaches offer ‘antidotes’ to the anxiety that randomness engenders in traditional IR as well as provide a paradigm that accepts uncertainty as inevitable (Feder 2002, 117). Thus, in contrast to the typically linear perceptions of change in mainstream IR— that is, changes in variables occur, but the effect is constant—CIR suggests that ‘things suffer change’. The contention is that the unpredictability of the emergent patterns of international life needs to be conceptualized within the framework of self-organizing criticality—that is, their dynamics ‘adapt to, or are themselves on, the edge of chaos, and most of the changes take place through catastrophic events rather than by following a smooth gradual path’ (Dunn 2007, 99). Complex international relations, in other words, suggests that change entails the possibility of a ‘radical qualitative effect’ (Richards 2000, 1). Therefore, the alleged arbitrariness of occurrences that conventional IR might describe as the effects of randomness (or exogenous/surprising shocks) could (and, in fact, more often than not does) reflect ignorance of their interactions. In fact, the reference to ‘chance’ is merely a metaphor for our lack of knowledge of the dynamics of complexity (Smith and Jenks 2006, 273).

In this respect, CIR theory sketches the fifth debate in the study of international life (see Table 2). Its outlines follow the proposition of the Gulbenkian Commission to break down the division between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ sciences, since both are pervaded by ‘complexity’. Therefore, scholars should not be ‘conceiving of humanity as mechanical, but rather instead conceiving nature as active and creative [to make] the laws of nature compatible with the idea of novelty and of creativity’ (Wallerstein 1996, 61–63). Complex international relations (unlike other IR approaches) acknowledges that patterns of international life are panarchic ‘hybrids’ of physical and social relations (Urry 2003, 18) and advocates such fusion (through the dissolution of the outdated distinction) of scientific realities (Whitman 2005, 45–64). Its complex adaptive thinking in effect challenges the very existence of ‘objective standards’ for the assessment of competing knowledge claims, because these are ‘not nature’s, but rather always human standards, standards which are not given but made . . . adopted by convention by the members of a specific community’ (Hoffmann and Riley 2002, 304). The complex adaptive thinking of CIR theory, therefore, is an instance of ‘true thinking’—‘thinking that looks disorder and uncertainty straight in the face’ (Smith and Jenks 2006, 4).

#### **Our method is similar to de Mesquita’s game theory which is 90% accurate**

de MESQUITA ‘11 (Bruce Bueno; Silver Professor of Politics – New York University and Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, "Fox-Hedging or Knowing: One Big Way to Know Many Things," <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/>, 7/18)

Given what we know today and given the problems inherent in dealing with human interaction, what is a leading contender for making accurate, discriminating, useful predictions of complex human decisions? In good hedgehog mode I believe one top contender is applied game theory. Of course there are others but I am betting on game theory as the right place to invest effort. Why? Because game theory is the only method of which I am aware that explicitly compels us to address human adaptability. Gardner and Tetlock rightly note that people are “self-aware beings who see, think, talk, and attempt to predict each other’s behavior—and who are continually adapting to each other’s efforts to predict each other’s behavior, adding layer after layer of new calculations and new complexity.” This adaptation is what game theory jargon succinctly calls “endogenous choice.” Predicting human behavior means solving for endogenous choices while assessing uncertainty. It certainly isn’t easy but, as the example of bandwidth auctions helps clarify, game theorists are solving for human adaptability and uncertainty with some success. Indeed, I used game theoretic reasoning on May 5, 2010 to predict to a large investment group’s portfolio committee that Mubarak’s regime faced replacement, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood, in the coming year. That prediction did not rely on in-depth knowledge of Egyptian history and culture or on expert judgment but rather on a game theory model called selectorate theory and its implications for the concurrent occurrence of logically derived revolutionary triggers. Thus, while the desire for revolution had been present in Egypt (and elsewhere) for many years, logic suggested that the odds of success and the expected rewards for revolution were rising swiftly in 2010 in Egypt while the expected costs were not.

This is but one example that highlights what Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who was quoted by Gardner and Tetlock, has said about game theory and prediction (referring, as it happens, to a specific model I developed for predicting policy decisions): “Bueno de Mesquita has demonstrated the power of using game theory and related assumptions of rational and self-seeking behavior in predicting the outcome of important political and legal processes.” Nice as his statement is for me personally, the broader point is that game theory in the hands of much better game theorists than I am has the potential to transform our ability to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices in many aspects of human interaction.

How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox, I gather information from a wide variety of experts. They are asked only for specific current information (Who wants to influence a decision? What outcome do they currently advocate? How focused are they on the issue compared to other questions on their plate? How flexible are they about getting the outcome they advocate? And how much clout could they exert?). They are not asked to make judgments about what will happen. Then, acting as a hedgehog, I use that information as data with which to seed a dynamic applied game theory model. The model’s logic then produces not only specific predictions about the issues in question, but also a probability distribution around the predictions. The predictions are detailed and nuanced. They address not only what outcome is likely to arise, but also how each “player” will act, how they are likely to relate to other players over time, what they believe about each other, and much more. Methods like this are credited by the CIA, academic specialists and others, as being accurate about 90 percent of the time based on large-sample assessments. These methods have been subjected to peer review with predictions published well ahead of the outcome being known and with the issues forecast being important questions of their time with much controversy over how they were expected to be resolved. This is not so much a testament to any insight I may have had but rather to the virtue of combining the focus of the hedgehog with the breadth of the fox. When facts are harnessed by logic and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.